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ABSTRACT 
In the wake of the recent debt crisis in Europe, we investigate the influence of board diversity 
on financial fragility and performance of European banks. Corporate governance codes in 
Europe recommend unitary and dual-board systems; therefore, we believe that the influence 
of board diversity may vary across governance mechanisms and that no other studies have 
addressed these variations and their influence on financial fragility across European countries. 
The results show that a critical mass of female representation on both the supervisory board 
and the board of directors may reduce banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis. However, 
interestingly, we find evidence that female directors on the management board are not risk 
averse. We argue that the degree of risk taking for female directors may vary based on their 
roles (non-executive or executive) and that female and male executive directors may have the 
same risk taking behaviour. Our empirical results provide guidelines to the regulators in 
Europe with respect to the recently approved proposal by the European Parliament on female 
representation. 
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Board Diversity and Financial Fragility: Evidence from 
European Banks 
 
1. Introduction  
World economies have experienced a deep recession due to the global financial crisis. The 
wave of bank collapses and scandals in the last decade has fuelled the drive for improved 
corporate governance.  In particular, there has been an increased emphasis on board diversity 
with the main focus being on gender diversity. The concept of board diversity as a means for 
improving corporate governance practices in the financial sector has proliferated in recent 
years following the onset, and the aftermath, of the financial crisis, such that there is a 
growing intervention by countries to implement quotas
i
 for top-level management, a primary 
example of this approach being that of Norway (Mateos de Cabo et al, 2012).  
Recently, the EU Commission (2012) agreed a proposal for a Directive to improve the gender 
balance of non-executive directors (NEDs) in listed companies by 1 January 2020. The 
European Parliament overwhelmingly approved proposals that all EU listed companies 
except small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) should substantially increase the number of 
women on EU corporate boards by setting a minimum objective that 40% of NEDs should be 
of the ‘under-represented gender’, generally women.  
 
There has been an on-going debate in the literature regarding the impact of diversity for many 
years. Jensen (1993) argued that more diverse boards with different perspectives and varied 
skills may lead to more efficiency in resource utilisation. More recently, the proponents of 
board diversity argue that diversity brings a variety of backgrounds, skills and perspectives to 
the boardroom, therefore directors and companies may benefit from these diverse social and 
occupational experiences in developing new products and strategies (Anderson et al., 2011).  
 On the other hand, the opponents of diversity claim that the cost of diversity – in terms of 
communication, co-ordination and conflict among directors with different backgrounds - 
exceeds its benefits (Putnam, 2007).  
 
The existing body of the literature tends to focus more on board diversity for non-financial 
companies. Adams and Mehran (2012) argue that little is known about board effectiveness in 
the financial sector as the vast majority of the existing literature tends to exclude financial 
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companies from their samples.   Few studies have been conducted on board diversity in the 
banking sector.  Those studies which have looked at the banking sector have tended to focus 
only on one specific country namely the US e.g. Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011), Berger 
et al., (2014) and Pathan and Faff (2013).  
 
In the European Union, corporate governance codes recommend a unitary board system in 8 
countries e.g. the UK and Sweden and a dual-board system in 10 countries e.g. Germany and 
Netherlands, though there might be some exceptions
ii
. Therefore, we argue that using pooled 
data from European banks with different governance mechanisms may lead to biased results. 
No other studies - to the best of our knowledge - have addressed the variations in governance 
mechanisms which could be an important omission as the proportion of female directors may 
vary between the board of directors in the unitary governance mechanism and the supervisory 
and management boards within the dual board mechanism. Moreover, our study is timely and 
has clear policy implications (see section 6). The empirical results provide guidelines to the 
regulators in Europe with respect to the recently approved proposal by the European 
Parliament on female representation. Finally and most importantly, none of the existing 
studies investigate the influence of board diversity on financial fragility. We try to fill these 
gaps in the literature using a unique hand collected dataset from 17 European countries.  
 
In this paper, we investigate the influence of board diversity on both financial fragility and 
performance using a sample of 99 European banks from 17 countries over the period 2004-
2012. We find that beyond a critical mass of 18% and 21% female directors on the board of 
directors and the supervisory boards respectively, banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis 
might significantly less. However, interestingly, we find evidence that female directors are 
not risk averse as the diversity-financial fragility nexus on management boards is also non-
linear but has a U shape relationship and appointing a female director beyond a critical mass of 
24% increases banks’ risk. This result is consistent with Adams and Funk (2012) and Farag and 
Mallin (2016) as they argue that female directors are less risk-averse than their male 
counterparts. We argue that female directors on the management board are not risk averse. 
We argue that the degree of risk taking for female directors may vary based on their roles 
(non-executive or executive) and that female and male executive directors may have the same 
risk taking behaviour.  Finally, and consistent with the resource dependence theory, we find a 
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positive and significant relationship between the proportion of female directors and financial 
performance for both the board of directors and the supervisory boards. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section discusses the 
theoretical perspectives deriving board diversity followed by a section on the literature and 
hypotheses development. We then present the data and the empirical models followed by the 
results and the robustness tests. Finally, we conclude the paper with a discussion of the main 
findings and the policy implications. 
 
2. Board Diversity: Theoretical Perspectives  
Several theoretical frameworks from different disciplines provide insights into the economic 
benefits and the influence of board diversity (Carter et al., 2010) e.g. agency, resource 
dependence, human capital, and social psychology theories. Agency theory assumes that a 
higher proportion of independent NEDs may lead to a better monitoring function of the board. 
Therefore, boards should include the appropriate mix of experience and backgrounds to better 
exercise their monitoring role and to evaluate management and assess business strategies 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003 and Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Female representation on the 
board may improve the board’s monitoring role and this may lower agency costs (Carter et al., 
2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Farag and Mallin, 2016). Carter et al. (2003) and Carter et 
al. (2010) argue that more diverse boards with different backgrounds are more independent 
and thus provide a better monitoring role. Nonetheless, agency theory does not provide strong 
support for the link between board diversity and financial performance (Carter et al., 2003). 
According to the resource dependence theory, the presence of female directors on the board 
brings different benefits and resources to the company (Carter et al., 2010). Moreover, 
females bring forward new opinions and perspectives that would not otherwise be 
demonstrated if the board were to be homogeneous, and this may improve financial 
performance (Mateos de Cabo et al., 2012). Therefore, the resource dependence theory 
provides the foundation and convincing theoretical argument with regard to board diversity 
and suggests that diverse boards have a broader range of more talented and well-connected 
directors. Moreover, board diversity per se may send a positive signal to the labour market 
(Carter et al., 2010).   
 
Furthermore, different types of directors provide different experiences, backgrounds and 
different human capital which may lead to a higher ability to address different environmental 
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dependencies (Hillman et al., 2000). Human capital theory states that directors with different 
experiences, sets of skills and educational backgrounds may lead to more diverse boards and 
thus benefit the overall performance of the company (Terjesen et al., 2009).  Moreover, more 
diverse boards with different perspectives and varied skills may lead to more efficiency in 
resource utilisation (Jensen, 1993), better management quality (unique human capital) and 
hence better financial performance (Terjesen et al., 2009).  Therefore, human capital theory 
complements the resource dependence theory in that board diversity may influence 
companies’ financial performance (Carter et al., 2010).  
 
According to contingency theory, internal and external circumstances are one of the main 
determinants of human capital and hence the influence of gender diversity on financial 
performance may vary based on companies’ internal and external environments (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009). On the other hand, the social psychological concept of minority status, which 
is derived from social impact theory, states that majority status groups have a remarkable 
influence on the decision making process (Carter et al., 2010). Therefore females, being 
usually in the minority on diverse boards, may not have the power to influence the board as 
the result of the internal group dynamics of the board (Westphal and Milton, 2000). Moreover, 
more diverse boards may lead to more conflict and divergent opinions which make the 
decision making process time-consuming and less effective (Campbell and Vera, 2008, Lau 
and Murnighan, 1998 and Carter et al., 2010).  
 
Drawing on the critical mass theory of Kanter (1977), Joecks et al (2013) argue that the skills 
that female directors (minority) may bring into the group are not the main determinant of 
board composition unless a critical mass of female directors has been appointed
iii
. Kogut et al 
(2014) argue that female quotas might create a critical mass of female directors to tip the 
equilibrium to structural equality defined as “the degree to which women directors are 
connected without relying upon male intermediaries”. 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
3.1 Board Diversity in the Banking Industry 
The literature on corporate governance, and board diversity in particular, is limited for 
financial institutions. The existing literature has tended to focus on the influence of board 
diversity on non-financial companies. Therefore, relatively little is known about the influence 
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of board diversity in financial institutions (Adams and Mehran, 2012). However, there have 
been a few studies which have focussed on the impact of board diversity in the banking 
industry; these studies have tended to focus on the US; see for example Richard (2000); 
Adams and Funk (2012); and Hagendorff and Keasey (2012). Board diversity in the 
European banking sector has received scant attention except for the studies by Mateos de 
Cabo et al, (2011 and 2012). Moreover, no other studies -to the best of our knowledge - have 
addressed the variations in governance mechanisms across European countries. Therefore, we 
believe that there remains a gap in the literature regarding the influence of board diversity on 
financial fragility and performance in European banks.  
3.2 Board Diversity and Financial Fragility 
World economies have experienced a deep recession due to the global financial crisis 2007- 
2008. The crisis hit Europe by the contagion effect and concerns were raised about the 
financial fragility of various financial institutions. Subsequently, a large number of financial 
institutions collapsed or were bailed out by governments during the global financial crisis e.g. 
RBS and HBOS in the UK; Dexia, Fortis, Hypo Real Estate and UBS in continental Europe 
(Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010 and Erkens et al., 2012). Grove et al. (2011) define financial 
fragility as a bank’s vulnerability to a financial crisis measured by loan quality measures e.g. 
Non-Performing Assets (NPA). Beltratti and Stulz, (2012) use other measures of financial 
fragility e.g. the percentage of liquid assets to total assets. They argue that banks with more 
liquid assets will be in a better position to cope with financing difficulties. Moreover, earlier 
Eng and Nabar (2007) used the percentage of loan loss reserve to gross loans as an alternative 
measure of financial difficulties.  
 
The stereotype that women are more risk averse than men may explain the low proportion of 
females sitting on the banks’ boards (Sunden and Surette, 1998). Moreover, this stereotype is 
the main reason for the “Glass Ceiling” on the corporate promotion ladder in banks (Mateos 
de Cabo et al., 2012). Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that boards of directors tend to be 
more homogeneous and less diverse when companies are operating in riskier environments. 
Therefore, there might be less likelihood of hiring female directors in banks due to the high 
financial risk associated with this industry. Moreover, firms with more gender diverse boards 
have been found to be less involved in sub-prime lending (Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011).  
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Furthermore, female CEOs might be seen as more risk averse compared with their male 
counterparts as they may rely on less leverage (Graham et al., 2013), less long-term debt,  
less earnings volatility, higher survival rate (Faccio et al., 2016) and be less involved in 
acquisitions (Huang and Kisgen, 2013).  Female CEOs have also exercised their share 
options early compared with their male counterparts (Huang and Kisgen, 2013). Arun et al 
(2015) find that the higher the proportion of female independent directors the more restrained 
earnings management practices in the UK. Sila et al (2016) find that unobserved company 
heterogeneity may drive the negative gender–risk relation.   
 
Adams and Funk (2012) find that female and male directors have substantial differences with 
respect to their risk attitude. This might be due to the belief that women may not perform well 
in less competitive environment (Gneezy et al., 2003 and Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). 
Consistent with the existing literature, Adams and Funk (2012) find that female directors are 
more benevolent and universally concerned but less power oriented than male directors. 
However, Adams and Funk (2012) show that some of the "typical" population gender gaps 
appear to reverse for directors, for example, in Sweden female directors are found to be more 
open to change and less risk-averse than their male counterparts. Therefore, appointing a 
female director need not lead to less risk-averse decisions as female directors may be more 
risk-loving than male directors (Adams and Funk,  2012).  
 
Mateos de Cabo et al., (2012) find that the proportion of female directors in boardrooms is 
higher for lower-risk banks; in addition, banks with a growth orientation are more likely to 
appoint female directors.  The above discussion shows that the findings of the existing 
literature support the negative relationship between board diversity and the attitude towards 
risk. To the best of our knowledge, there are no other studies that investigate the influence of 
diversity on financial fragility in European banks. Therefore, based on the above discussion 
we formulate our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the proportion of female directors and 
bank’s financial fragility.  
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3.3 Board Diversity and Financial Performance 
The board diversity-financial performance nexus has been investigated in the academic 
literature for non-financial companies, however, there is mixed evidence and no real 
agreement in the academic research on the impact of board diversity on firm performance. 
This could be due to the discrepancies in sample sizes, time periods, and industries in 
addition to the econometrics problems e.g. endogeneity.  The diversity- performance nexus is 
more problematic when quotas are applied due to some methodological issues e.g. the exact 
date of the quota event, the choice of control group in the context of experimental studies, 
sample selection and the influence of other confounding effects e.g. other governance-related 
reforms (Ferreira, 2015). Moreover, there is no formal theory that interprets the diversity-
performance nexus, therefore the existing literature largely relies on the results of the 
empirical studies of non-financial companies (Pathan and Faff, 2013).  
 
A few studies find no positive impact of board diversity on financial performance. Randøy et 
al. (2006) investigate the impact of gender, age and ethnic diversity on the financial 
performance of the top 500 companies in Denmark, Norway and Sweden and find no 
significant impact on companies’ financial performance. Similarly, Farrell and Hersch (2005) 
and Francoeur et al. (2007) find that more gender diverse boards have no impact on company 
performance in the US and Canada respectively. However, Ryan and Haslam (2005) find that 
during a period of poor market performance, companies who appointed female directors had 
tended to have negative performance during the preceding five months compared with 
companies who appointed male directors. 
 
Moreover, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have an overall negative 
effect on firm performance in the US although they enhance the overall effectiveness of the 
board. On the other hand, a large strand of the literature finds that there is a positive influence 
of board diversity on financial performance, mostly in the US; see for instance, Erhardt et al. 
(2003); Miller and Triana (2009),  in addition to Campbell and Vera (2008) in Spain. The 
latter study highlights that the causal relationship between these two endogenous variables 
runs from board diversity to financial performance. Moreover, the diversity-performance 
nexus can be partially mediated by both innovation and company reputation (Miller and 
Triana (2009).  
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There have been relatively few studies that investigate the relationship between board 
diversity and financial performance in the financial sector. Pathan and Faff (2013) study large 
US bank holding companies over the period 1997-2011 and find that pre-Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX), i.e. 1997-2002, gender diversity improves bank performance; however this positive 
effect declines post-SOX (2003-2006) and the financial crisis (2007-2011) periods 
respectively. Kim and Starks (2016) find that directors’ heterogeneity and the proportion of 
female directors in particular result in higher company valuation. Similarly, Bantel and 
Jackson (1989) find that innovative banks are characterised by heterogeneous boards and this 
facilitates the decision-making process. Board diversity in the financial sector is also found to 
have a positive influence on corporate social performance (Siciliano, 1996) and company’s 
competitive advantage (Richard, 2000). Moreover, positive announcement returns to mergers 
are reported by more occupationally diversified boards (Hagendorff and Keasey, 2010 and 
2012).  
 
We believe that board diversity creates both costs and benefits to companies. Drawing on the 
resource dependence and the human capital theories, we believe that female directors may 
bring to the board different backgrounds, experience and opinions and this may lead to better 
financial performance. Therefore, we expect that more diverse boards may have better 
financial performance if the benefits of diversity - in terms of better advisory and monitoring 
roles - exceed the costs of communication and conflict between managerial levels. Based on 
the above discussion we formulate our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the proportion of female directors and 
bank’s financial performance 
 
4. Methodology  
4.1 Data and Sample 
We hand collect data on board diversity, financial fragility, financial performance and 
governance characteristics for a sample of listed and private European banks over the period 
2004-2012. We constrain our sample to banks located in the EU as they are broadly subject to 
similar regulatory and governance backgrounds. Our sample also includes banks operating in 
Switzerland as part of the single market. Swiss banks are the most widely regarded in Europe as 
they have a unique reputation in the banking sector globally. Our main source is the “The 
Bankers Top 1000 World Banks” report which includes financial institutions from all over the 
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globe encompassing six continents. The total number of banks included in the report from EU 
countries and Switzerland is 223 banks. We exclude EU countries with less than two  banks e.g. 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Malta, Slovakia and Luxemburg (11 banks). To be consistent with the 
literature we exclude credit institutions and real estate and mortgage banks due to the differences 
in their operating structures (58 institutions.) Moreover, we excluded 55 banks with missing data 
either from Bankscope, Thomson One Banker and Datastream databases or the annual reports and 
the websites of the respective banks. Thus our final sample is 99 banks iv. Our sample banks are 
located in 17 countries namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Cyprus, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UKv. 
We excluded Norway as it introduced a compulsory gender quota for listed companies in 2008 by 
which the percentage of female NEDs sitting on the board had to be at least 40%. Moreover, 
Norway is not a member state in the EUvi. 
 
Our sample includes both board structures, i.e. unitary and dual boards Therefore, we classify our 
sample into 53 banks with unitary boards and 46 dual board banks for which a complete set of 
information is available. Our dataset is unbalanced panel data and consists of 462 and 393 bank-
year observations for unitary and dual board structures respectively over the period 2004-2012.  
We measure gender diversity by the percentage of female directors sitting on the board
vii
.  
Moreover, as the appointment of additional female directors may enhance financial 
performance, we use the squared percentage of female directors as an independent variable in 
the estimation. We define financial fragility as a bank’s vulnerability to financial crisis. 
Grove et al. (2011) use the Non-Performing Assets (NPA) ratio as a measure of financial 
fragility. The NPA ratio is calculated by dividing the level of non-performing loans to total 
loans. Grove et al. (2011) argue that loan quality measures e.g. the NPA are often used by 
rating agencies to assess the overall ratings of the banks and are considered to be an essential 
credit quality measure with respect to the banks’ lending practices. However, we use a stricter 
and more comprehensive measure of banks’ financial fragility, namely the ratio of impaired 
loans to gross loans. Moody’s rating agency argue that impaired loans are a better measure of 
asset quality than non-performing loans, as they are more comprehensive, globally 
comparable, and less prone to regulatory discretion
viii
. Other measures of financial fragility 
are used as a robustness check e.g. the NPA ratio, and the percentage of liquid assets to total 
assets following Beltratti and Stulz, (2012) who argue that banks with more liquid assets will 
be in a better position to reduce their balance sheet and to cope with financing difficulties. 
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We also use the percentage of loan loss reserves to gross loans as an alternative measure of 
financial fragility following Eng and Nabar (2007). 
 
We use the return on total assets (ROA), and the return on equity (ROE) as measures of a 
bank’s financial performance. We calculate ROA as net income divided by the average of the 
two most recent years of total assets, while we define the ROE as net income divided by the 
average of the two most recent years of total equity. We also use the interest rate margin as 
an alternative proxy for a bank’s financial performance. The interest rate margin is the ratio 
of net interest revenue divided by the total earning assets. This study incorporates a 
comprehensive set of bank-specific characteristics to control for bank and country 
heterogeneity. We control for governance characteristics proxied by board size, board 
independence and CEO/chair duality. We measure the board of directors’ size and both 
supervisory and management board size by the total number of board members.  We also 
control for board independence by using the percentage of independent non-executive 
directors sitting on the board of directors and the supervisory board. We believe that board 
independence may have a positive impact on diversity and that more independent boards are 
more likely to embrace diversity. Moreover, combining the roles of CEO/Chair for unitary 
boards might be seen as an indication of power vested in a single individual and hence lead to 
less diversity. CEO/Chair duality is defined by a dummy variable equal to 1 where the roles 
of the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise.  
 
We argue that larger banks tend to have larger boards and are expected to have more diverse 
boards (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Aebi et al., 2012). Therefore, we control for bank size, 
defined by the natural logarithm of total assets in euros. We also control for bank age, defined 
as the number of years since the bank’s foundation. Moreover, we control for whether the 
bank is listed or privately held by creating a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for 
listed banks and 0 otherwise.  
 
Furthermore, we control for the total capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in the banking 
sector. Moreover, to address the differences in legal environments, we create a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank’s headquarters is located in a common law country 
and 0 otherwise. We also use Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural 
differences across EU countries. We use the individual cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2001) 
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separately and present the results using the Power Distance dimension (Frijns et al., 2016, 
Aggarwal and Goodell, 2009). Moreover, we control for bank internationalisation following 
the study Ekman et al (2014) by creating a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank 
has overseas branches and 0 otherwise.  
 
We use the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank 
formulated in 2003, 2007, and 2012. This is a unique survey on how banks are regulated and 
supervised for 143 jurisdictions around the world.  The survey includes questions on banking 
regulations and supervision including disclosure and enforcement. There are 32 and 20 
Yes/No questions on disclosure and enforcement respectively. Therefore, we developed two 
indices namely disclosure and enforcement by creating dummy variables taking the value of 
1 if the answer to a question is yes and 0 otherwise. The sum of each dummy is the disclosure 
and enforcement indices respectively
ix
.  Finally, we control for the macroeconomic indicators 
by using the natural logarithm of the country’s GDP in euros; furthermore, country and year 
dummies are used to capture country and time heterogeneity respectively. Table 1 presents a 
description for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
4.2 Endogeneity  
There has been a long debate in the empirical literature about the endogeneity between board 
diversity and financial performance and in particular their causal relationship. Endogeneity 
results in biased and inconsistent coefficients and this makes statistical inference virtually 
impossible (Wintoki et al, 2012). The existing body of the literature has investigated two 
main sources of endogeneity namely unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity (reverse 
causality) e.g. the causality between board diversity and financial performance; see for 
example Adams and Ferreira (2009 ); Carter et al (2010) and  Pathan and Faff (2013).  
Researchers usually use static panel data (fixed effects model) to control for company 
heterogeneity and any other unobservable company characteristics that may drive the results
x
 
(e.g. managerial ability); see for example Adams and Ferreira (2009). 
 
Wooldridge (2002) argues that in the case of a dynamic nature of independent variables (e.g. 
gender diversity) and a past dependent variable (e.g. the ROA), the fixed effects model may 
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be biased. Wintoki et al (2012) claim that the dynamic nature of the governance-performance 
nexus is a potential source of endogeneity. They argue that the current governance 
characteristics (e.g. board size and independence) are a function of past financial performance 
and ignoring this link may have serious consequences for statistical inference. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) argue that higher past financial performance leads to higher CEO ability 
and bargaining power and this may lead to less board independence. We agree with Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998) and argue that higher past financial performance/ fragility may also 
result in less diverse boards when the CEO has greater bargaining power.  
 
4.3 Empirical modelling 
To overcome the above econometrics problems and to capture the alternative possible sources 
of endogeneity, we use a dynamic panel data model namely the two-step system generalised 
method of moments (GMM). Moreover, as a robustness check, we also estimate the fixed 
effects models. The system GMM combines in a system the equation in first-differences with 
the same equation expressed in levels as in equations 1, 2 and 3 respectively.   
 
      ititiitittitiit vYearxFPBDFFFF    '.1.0                         (1) 
      ititiitittitiit vYearxFFBDFPFP    '.1.0                        (2) 
     ititiitittitiit vYearxFFFPBDBD    '.1.0                          (3) 
 
Where, FF is bank financial fragility, FP is the bank financial performance, BD is bank board 
gender diversity, itx  is a k*1 vector of corporate governance characteristics (board size, 
independence, CEO power), loan quality and other control variables in addition to bank-and 
country-specific effects. 1'  is a k*1 vector of parameters to be estimated, iv  is the panel 
unobservable heterogeneity (which may be correlated with the covariates), and it  is 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over the whole sample with variance 2 . iv  
and it  assumed to be independent for each i over all t. We use the adjustment for small 
samples introduced by Windmeijer (2000) to improve the robustness of our results and to 
avoid any potential bias in the estimated asymptotic standard error.  
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We use lagged levels instruments for the regression in differences, and lags of the first-
differenced variables for the equation in levels. Therefore, we use three lags of financial 
performance, financial fragility, board size, board independence, and the proportion of female 
directors as instruments in the equation in first-differences, and two lags of their difference as 
instruments in the equation in levels (Andres and Vallelado, 2008; and Wintoki et al., 2012).  
Roodman (2009) and Wintoki et al. (2012) claim that it may be possible to use a set of 
historical values of suspect endogenous variables as a valid internal instrument to control for 
simultaneity and other sources of endogeneity and this eliminates the need for external 
instruments
xi
 (Wintoki et al., 2012). We carry out rigorous tests to assess the validity of the 
orthogonality assumptions and the strength of our instruments. We calculate the Arellano and 
Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation with a null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. Rejecting the null in the first-differenced errors for the second or higher 
order suggests that the moment conditions used are not valid (Roodman, 2009). 
 
To test for the over-identifying restrictions, we report the Hansen test results. The null 
hypothesis associated with the Hansen test is that the instruments are exogenous. 
Insignificant values for the Hansen test indicate that the instruments are adequate and that the 
model is correctly specified. Finally, as the residuals may be correlated across banks and 
across time and therefore the standard errors can be biased, we estimate, following Roodman 
(2009), clustered standard errors to produce more robust, reliable and unbiased coefficient 
estimates.  
 
5. Empirical Results  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the pooled sample for the main variables used in 
the empirical analysis. We present in Panels A and B the descriptive statistics for the unitary 
and the two tier board banks respectively. The figures presented in Panel A show that the 
average proportion of female directors ranges from 0 % to 58.3% with an average of 10% 
across the unitary boards sample. The average ROA is 0.28% and ranges from  -22.4% to 
9.7%, while the average impaired loans to gross loans is 5.7% with a standard deviation of 
3.7% and ranges from 0.05% to 62.4%. Table 1 also shows that the mean value of the board 
of directors’ size is 14.7 directors with a standard deviation of 4.4 and a range from 4 to 31 
directors during the period of study. The average proportion of the independent non-
executive directors across the sample is 46.4% with a standard deviation of 20.9% and the 
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CEO/Chair duality prevails in 3.5% of our sample. Furthermore, the average capital ratio is 
12.2% and 72% of the banks have international branches.  Finally, 19.3% of the sample 
banks are privately held while the average bank age across the sample is 100 years. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Figure 1 presents the average proportion of female directors sitting on European banks with 
unitary boards over the period 2004-2012 by country. We notice that Sweden has the highest 
proportion of female directors of 34.4% followed by Finland and France with average 
proportions of female directors of 22.2% and 17.5% respectively. However, Cyprus, Greece, 
Italy and Portugal have the lowest proportions of female directors of 4.4%, 4.3%, 3.6% and 
3.3% respectively.  Figure 2 presents the average proportions of female directors in European 
banks with unitary boards from 2004-2012 and shows that the average female representation 
increased from 7.6% in 2004 to 15.3% in 2012. 
 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the two-tier board sample banks. We 
notice that the average proportions of female directors sitting on the supervisory and 
management boards are 13.1% and 3% respectively. We notice that the financial performance 
of dual board banks on average is relatively higher than those of their unitary board 
counterparts as the average ROA is 0.57% and ranges from -2.5% to 2.9%, while the average 
impaired loans to gross loans is 5.3% with a standard deviation of 10.44% and ranges from 
0.03% to 73.2%. Panel B also shows that the average size of the supervisory board is 12.6 
directors with a standard deviation of 5.6% and ranges from 4 to 29 directors. However, the 
average size of the management board is remarkably much lower with 5.3 directors and with 
a maximum of 16 directors during the period of the study. Moreover, the average proportion 
of the independent non-executive directors across the supervisory boards is 68% with a 
standard deviation 18.7%. The average capital ratio as the regulatory requirement is 14.11% 
and 65% of the banks with dual boards has overseas branches.  Finally, 29.5% of the sample 
banks are privately held while the average bank age across the sample is 79.4 years. 
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Figure 3 presents the average proportions of female directors sitting on the supervisory and 
management boards over the period 2004-2012 by country. We notice that the average 
proportion of female directors sitting on the supervisory board is much higher by far than 
those on the management board across all countries. Germany has the highest female 
representation on the supervisory board of 18.6%, followed by Denmark and Austria with 
average proportions of females of 16.3% and 15.4% respectively. On the other hand the 
lowest female representation is found in Italy and Portugal with averages of 3.5% and 2% 
respectively. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that Austria has the highest female representation on 
the management board (6.3%) while there are no female directors sitting on the management 
board in Portugal. Figure 4 presents the average proportion of female directors sitting on each 
of the supervisory and management boards over the period 2004-2012. Figure 4 shows that 
the proportion of female directors on the supervisory board increased from an average of 11.5% 
in 2004 to 15.8% in 2012. Moreover, we notice that there is a modest increase in the 
proportion of female directors sitting on the management board from 2.6% in 2004 to 3.7% in 
2012. We also notice that the proportion of female directors on the supervisory board is 
higher than those sitting on the board of directors in the banks with a unitary board structure. 
To sum up, Table 3 presents a cross country analysis for board structure and diversity for the 
unitary and dual board sample banks over the period of study. 
 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 and Table 3 about here 
 
Tables 4 and 5 present the correlation matrixes for the main variables used in the empirical 
analysis for the unitary and dual board sample banks respectively. The results show that there 
is no evidence of multicollinearity.  
Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here 
Table 6 presents the results of the system GMM estimator for the influence of female 
directors on EU banks’ financial fragility as defined in Equation 1. Panels A and B present 
the results for the unitary and dual board respectively.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here. 
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The results presented in Table 6 reject the null hypothesis that the lagged endogenous 
variable (impaired loans to gross loans) is zero in Panels A and B for the unitary and dual 
board banks respectively. This implies rejection of a static panel data model in favour of a 
dynamic model. The results of Model 1 show that there is a positive but insignificant 
relationship between the proportion of female directors and the ratio of impaired loans to 
gross loans as a proxy for banks’ financial fragility.  
 
However, given the low proportion of female representation on boards and drawing on the 
critical mass theory of Kanter (1977), we believe that appointing a critical mass of female 
directors may have an influence on financial fragility. Therefore, we control for the quadratic 
term of the proportion of female directors as presented in Model 2. We find that the diversity-
financial fragility relationship is non-linear and has an inverted U shape. This suggests that 
female directors apparently have a positive impact on banks’ financial fragility. However, 
appointing a female director beyond a critical mass of 18% may reduce banks’ vulnerability 
to financial crisis
xii
. This result is consistent with Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) and 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) as they argue that female directors tend to be more risk 
averse and this stereotype of being risk averse is the main reason for the “Glass Ceiling” on 
the corporate promotion ladder. Based on the above discussion we cannot reject our first 
hypothesis when a critical mass of female directors has been appointed in banks with unitary 
boards. 
 
With respect to dual board banks, the results presented in Model 3 show that there is a 
positive but insignificant relationship between the proportion of female directors on the 
supervisory board and the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans. Moreover, consistent with 
the results for the unitary boards, we find that the diversity-financial fragility relationship is 
non-linear and has an inverted U shape as the coefficient for female directors on supervisory 
boards is positive and highly significant while its quadratic term is negative and highly 
significant as presented in Model 4. This suggests that beyond a critical mass of 21%, 
appointing an additional female director may reduce banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis. 
Again, this result is consistent with Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) and Jianakoplos and 
Bernasek (1998). 
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On the other hand, we find an insignificant relationship between the proportion of female 
directors on the management boards and banks’ financial fragility. However interestingly 
when we control for the quadratic term of the proportion of female directors on the 
management boards as in Model 4, we find that the coefficient on the proportion of female 
directors is negative and highly significant however its quadratic term is positive and highly 
significant. This suggests that the diversity-financial fragility nexus on management boards is 
non-linear and has a U shape. This also implies that beyond a critical mass of 24%, appointing an 
additional female director increases banks’ risk. This result is consistent with the study of Adams 
and Funk (2012) in which they argue that female directors are more open to change and less 
risk-averse than their male counterparts. Therefore, appointing a female director need not 
lead to less risk-averse decisions as female directors are more risk-loving than male directors 
(Adams and Funk,  2012).  
 
The above results are interesting, as we argue that the degree of risk taking behaviour for 
female directors may vary based on their roles. Global statistics show that female directors 
are mainly appointed as NEDs and/or INEDs on either the board of directors (in a unitary 
board system) or the supervisory board (in a dual board system). Table 2 shows that the 
proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors, supervisory and management 
boards are10, 13% and 3% respectively. Therefore, we argue that female executive directors 
may have the same risk taking behaviour as their male counterparts. Based on the above 
results we cannot reject our first hypothesis when a critical mass of female directors has been 
appointed in the supervisory board. However, we reject our first hypothesis with respect to 
management boards when a critical mass of female directors has been appointed. Finally, the 
tests regarding serial correlation reject the absence of first order, but not second order serial 
correlation. The models are well specified as the Hansen test does not reject the over-
identifying restrictions. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the system GMM estimator for the influence of female 
directors on EU banks’ financial performance as defined in Equation 2. Panels A and B 
present the results for the unitary and dual boards respectively.  
 
Insert Table 7 about here. 
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The results presented in Table 7 reject the null hypothesis that the lagged endogenous 
variable (ROA) is zero in Panels A and B. This implies rejection of a static panel data model 
in favour of a dynamic model. The results presented in Model 1 show that there is a positive 
and significant relationship at the 5% level between diversity and financial performance of 
unitary board banks. This suggests that the higher the proportion of female directors the 
higher the bank’s financial performance. Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Anderson et al. (2011) 
argue that operationally complex companies benefit from more diverse boards as the different 
perspectives and viewpoints of board members lead to better monitoring benefits for the 
shareholders and a stronger advisory role for managers. In Model 2, we estimate the effect of 
appointing an additional female director on financial performance. Drawing on the critical 
mass theory of Kanter (1977), Joecks et al (2013) argue that the influence of female directors 
is not the main determinant of board composition unless a critical mass of female directors 
has been appointed. Therefore, we expect that the diversity-performance relationship might 
be non-linear and appointing a critical mass of female directors may have an influence on 
financial performance.  
 
Interestingly, when we control for the quadratic term of the proportion of female directors in 
Model 2, we find that there is a positive and highly significant relationship between boards’ 
gender diversity and banks’ financial performance.  Moreover, we find a negative and 
significant (P<5%) relationship between the quadratic term of the proportion of female 
directors and financial performance. This implies that the performance-diversity relationship 
is non-linear and has an inverted U shape; meaning that appointing up to 21% female 
directors may increase financial performance after which appointing an additional female 
director results in a decrease in financial performance
xiii
.  
 
This result is consistent with those presented in Table 6 as appointing additional female 
directors may lead to lower risk and hence lower financial performance.  Furthermore, Lang 
(1986), Arrow (1998), Putnam (2007), O’Reilly et al. (1989) find that diversity may cause 
communication problems and increases the inter-group conflicts and this may lead to lower 
financial performance. Our result is also consistent with Carter et al. (2010) who argue that, 
according to contingency theory, the net effect of gender diversity can be either positive or 
negative from a financial performance perspective. Based on the above results we reject our 
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second hypothesis when a critical mass of female directors has been appointed in banks with 
unitary boards. 
 
With respect to dual boards, the results presented in Panel B show that there is a positive and 
significant (P<5%) relationship between the proportion of female directors on supervisory 
boards and banks’ financial performance as in Model 3. This suggests that the higher the 
proportion of female directors the better the financial performance. This result is consistent 
with the resource dependence theory and human capital theory. However, we find that the 
coefficient on the quadratic term of female directors on the supervisory board is negative and 
highly significant as in Model 4. This suggests that the diversity-performance relationship is 
non-linear and has an inverted U shape and that appointing an additional female director 
beyond a critical mass of 23% may reduce financial performance.  
 
By contrast for management boards, we find that diversity-performance has a U shape 
relationship and appointing an additional female director beyond a critical mass of 28% may 
have a positive impact on financial performance as presented in Model 4. The above results 
are consistent with Lang (1986), Arrow (1998), Putnam (2007), O’Reilly et al. (1989). 
Moreover, it is consistent with our arguments regarding the degree of risk attitude of female 
directors on management boards. Based on the above discussion we reject our second 
hypothesis when a critical mass of female directors has been appointed in the supervisory 
board. However, we cannot reject our second hypothesis with respect to management boards 
beyond a critical mass of female directors. Finally, the tests regarding serial correlation reject 
the absence of first order, but not second order serial correlation. The models are well 
specified as the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions. 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the system GMM estimator for the main determinants for the 
proportion of female directors on EU banks as defined in Equation 3. Panels A, B and C 
present the results for the board of directors (unitary board), supervisory and management 
boards (dual boards) respectively.  
 
Insert Table 8 about here. 
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
22 
 
Again, the results presented in Table 8 reject the static panel data model in favour of a 
dynamic model. We find that there is a negative but insignificant relationship between banks’ 
financial fragility and the proportion of female directors. On the other hand, the results show 
that there is a negative and significant (P<5) relationship between financial performance and 
the proportion of female directors sitting on European banks. This may imply that the higher 
the financial performance the lower the board diversity. 
 
We agree with Adams and Ferreira (2009) that diverse boards are likely to be associated with 
stronger governance characteristics. Looking at our results in Model 1, we find a positive and 
significant (P<5%) relationship between board size and independence and the proportion of 
female representation on the board of directors. This suggests that female directors are likely 
to be appointed in larger and more independent boards. This result is consistent with 
Brammer et al. (2007) and Conyon and Mallin (1997) as they find that larger boards and 
boards with a higher proportion of NEDs are more likely to have a higher percentage of 
female directors.  
 
With respect to the main determinants of the female representation on supervisory boards, the 
results presented in Model 2 are similar to those of the board of directors in Model 1 and thus 
board size and independence are the main determinants for the proportion of female directors. 
Moreover, we find that big banks tend to have a higher proportion of female directors 
compared with smaller banks. Furthermore, the results show that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between the power distance index and female representation on the 
supervisory board. The index is concerned with the expectations of less powerful members in 
a society with respect to equal distribution of power. This suggests that in countries with dual 
board banks people accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has a place and the power 
is distributed equally (Hofstede, 2001). 
 
With respect to the main determinants of female representation on management boards, we 
find that there is a negative and highly significant relationship between banks’ financial 
fragility and the proportion of female directors on management boards. This suggests that the 
higher the banks’ financial fragility the lower the proportion of female directors. This may 
imply that banks with higher risk and more vulnerability to financial crisis (e.g. due to the 
poor loan quality) are likely to be associated with less diverse management boards. This may 
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also suggest that high risk and more financially fragile banks are less likely to appoint female 
directors and this is due to the belief that females are more risk averse and would tend not to 
condone more risky decisions.  We also find a positive and highly significant relationship 
between financial performance and the female representation on management boards. 
 
Moreover, we find a negative and highly significant relationship between management board 
size and gender diversity. This result is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2009) as they 
argue that boards tend to be more homogeneous and less diverse when companies are 
operating in riskier environments. Table 2 shows that the average proportion of female 
directors on the management board is 3% and this suggests that management boards are 
mainly homogenous and male dominated. Adams and Ferreira (2007) also argue that in 
riskier environments homogeneous boards may reduce the monitoring process as board 
heterogeneity may be considered as a potential source of conflict and difficulties in decision 
making.  
Furthermore, the results also show that listed companies are likely to have a higher 
proportion of female directors on the management board. Our models are well specified as 
the tests regarding serial correlation reject the absence of first order, but not the second order 
and the Hansen test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions. 
 
As robustness checks, we estimate the fixed effects regressions for both unitary and dual 
boards and obtained similar results. We also re-estimate the regression models pre and post 
the global financial crisis and found that our results are more robust during the period post 
crisis as we find that the higher the proportion of female directors the lower the banks’ 
vulnerability to financial crisis.  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion  
There has been an ongoing debate about the rationale and importance of board diversity. 
Female under-representation has long been a global phenomenon in developed and 
developing countries despite the benefits that female directors may bring to boardrooms. For 
instance the proportion of female CEOs in the US is 3% while the proportion of female 
directors ranges between 10-15% (Kogut et al., 2014). Female directors’ under-representation 
might be partially caused by the fact that women tend to be strongly represented in some non-
board roles e.g. human resources, change management and customer care (Higgs, 2003). 
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However, there has been a remarkable increase in the proportion of female directors over the 
past few years in particular during, and after, the financial crisis. This might be due to the 
changes in legislation e.g. female quotas.  
In this paper, we investigate the influence of board diversity on both financial fragility and 
performance for a sample of 99 banks from 17 countries over the period 2004-2012. The 
results of the system GMM estimator show that the diversity-financial fragility relationship is 
non-linear and has an inverted U shape. This suggests that beyond a critical mass of 18% and 
21% appointing an additional female director on the board of directors and the supervisory 
board respectively may reduce banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis. This result is consistent 
with Mateos de Cabo et al, (2012) and Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) as they argue that 
female directors tend to be more risk averse and this stereotype of being risk averse is the 
main reason for the “Glass Ceiling” on the corporate promotion ladder.  
 
However interestingly we find evidence that female directors are not risk averse as the 
diversity-financial fragility nexus on management boards is also non-linear but has a U shape 
and appointing an additional female director beyond a critical mass of 24% increases banks’ risk. 
Adams and Funk (2012) argue that female directors are less risk-averse than their male 
counterparts. Therefore, appointing a female director need not lead to less risk-averse 
decisions (Adams and Funk, 2012). We argue that the degree of risk taking behaviour for 
female directors may vary based on their roles. Farag and Mallin (2016) find that female 
CEOs are not risk averse compared with their male counterparts. Therefore, we argue that 
female and male executive directors may have the same risk taking behaviour. 
 
We also find a positive and significant relationship between the proportion of female 
directors and financial performance for both the board of directors and the supervisory board. 
This result is consistent with resource dependence theory and human capital theory. 
Moreover, we find that the diversity-performance nexus is non-linear and has an inverted U 
shape. This implies that beyond a critical mass of 21% and 23%, appointing an additional 
female director on the board of directors and the supervisory board respectively decreases 
financial performance. Board diversity may cause communication problems and increases the 
inter-group conflicts and this may lead to lower financial performance (Lang, 1986; Arrow, 
1998; Putnam, 2007; O’Reilly et al., 1989). 
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On the other hand, we find that the diversity-performance nexus on management boards is 
non-linear and has a U shape. Therefore, appointing a female director beyond a critical mass 
of 28% may lead to better financial performance. This result is consistent with Carter et al. 
(2010) as the net effect of gender diversity can be either positive or negative from a financial 
performance perspective. The result is also consistent with our argument on the risk-taking 
behaviour of female directors with respect to their role as executive directors. 
 
We also find that board size and independence are the main determinants for the proportion 
of female directors on the board of directors and the supervisory boards. This result is 
consistent with Brammer et al. (2007) and Conyon and Mallin (1997). On the other hand, 
management boards seem to be more homogenous and less diverse. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) argue that boards tend to be more homogeneous and less diverse when companies are 
operating in riskier environments. Finally, we find that banks with higher risk and more 
vulnerability to financial crisis (e.g. due to the poor loan quality) are likely to be associated 
with less diverse management boards.  
 
This study has a number of policy implications. The relationship between board diversity and 
bank risk may potentially have important implications for stability and increased confidence 
in the banking sector. Our empirical results provide support for the calls by various 
government reports e.g. Lord Davies Report in 2011 for more board diversity in the UK and 
the European Commission (2012) recommendations on board diversity. However, given the 
striking results of the influence of a critical mass of female directors, policy makers should 
carefully address the concerns regarding the economic impact of the call for more diverse 
boards or of imposing female quotas. Although it is not easy to draw a conclusion on the 
impact of female quotas on financial performance (Ferreira, 2015), in Norway for instance, 
once the law was passed, there was a remarkable decline (23%) in the proportion of public 
limited companies whilst a higher proportion of the Norwegian companies became listed in 
London (Kogut et al., 2014). Moreover, imposing the 40% quota in Norway was associated 
with lower financial performance (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). Kogut et al (2014) argue that a 
small quota (between 10% and 20%) can achieve large structural consequences and social 
justice. We agree with Kogut et al (2014) that small quotas may be preferable as they are the 
key to better structural equality as female quotas may enhance their network and connectivity 
and this may lead to a better position for female directors. 
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Future research might investigate the relationship between banks’ specific characteristics and 
the propensity to appoint female directors, and also investigate the impact of the appointment 
of a new female director on board dynamics and on the bank’s overall risk and return.  
Moreover, we believe that further analysis of the influence of directors’ characteristics and 
the broader concept of board diversity on corporate sustainability and risk-taking behaviour 
may provide additional insights to the results of our empirical study.  
 
 
ENDNOTES
                                                          
i
In January 2006 Norway enforced a gender quota requirement on listed companies with the target of 40% females on the 
board by 2008. Whilst the UK and many other countries have not introduced binding gender quotas to facilitate board 
diversity, nonetheless there has been a move by governments towards targets for gender representation on boards, for 
example the Davies Report (2011) and also its subsequent annual updates in the UK.  
ii
 In the remaining 9 countries a hybrid system applies and companies can choose between a one and two-tier approach. 
Moreover, in some European countries e.g. registered companies in Italy, there is the choice to follow one of three 
governance models: a unitary governance system; a dual governance system with distinct supervisory and management 
functions; or the traditional model in Italy with a decision-making board and a separate board of auditors. 
iii
 Kanter (1977) suggests that group interaction can be classified into 4 areas namely uniform, skewed, tilted, and balanced 
groups. In the uniform groups, all members have the same characteristics i.e. male or female in the context of gender. When 
the male type dominates, the group is identified as skewed. Joecks et al (2013) report that the proportion of females in  
skewed groups is up to 20%.  However, the tilted group has less extreme distribution compared with the skewed group as 
females (as the minority) can impact the group culture; female representation in the tilted group ranges from 20-40% (Joecks 
et al., 2013). Finally, the balanced group focuses on the pool of talent and skills and not on the proportion of males and 
females (sub-groups). In the balanced group, the female representation ranges from 40-60% on average and the performance 
of the balanced group is expected to be higher than the skewed group (Kanter, 1977 and Joecks et al., 2013). 
iv
 Andres and Vallelado (2008- JBF p2572) investigated the role of the board of directors using a sample of 65 banks from 
six countries over the period 1996-2006.  
v
 Some countries have recently introduced a gender quota e.g. France (2016), Italy (2015), Spain (2015), 
Germany (2016) and the Netherlands (2016). For more details, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/womenonboards/factsheet_women_on_boards_web_2015-10_en.pdf 
vi
 We estimate our models with and without Norway and Sweden as obvious outliers with respect to the 
proportion of female directors and find similar results. 
vii
 We also use the Blau index as an alternative measure of board diversity. The Blau index is calculated as the 
percentage of board members in each category (male/female). The index values range from 0 to 0.5 which 
occurs when the board is equally balanced. 
viii
 See for instance    https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Impaired-loans-better-gauge-of-Taiwanese-banks-asset-
quality--PR_257689 
ix
 For more details please see  
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK
:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html#Original_Database_by_country__40kb_each_ 
x
 The fixed effects model has a strict exogeneity assumption in which, for instance, current board diversity and 
governance characteristics are independent of past financial performance variables. 
xi
 Although the higher order of lag lengths results in more exogenous instruments, the use of internal instruments 
may cause the problem of weak instruments as the number of lags increases (Wintoki et al., 2012). However, we used 
different lag lengths as an empirical trade-off.  
xii
 We find similar results when we use both the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets and the ratio of loan loss 
reserves to gross loans.  
xiii
 We find similar results when we use the ROE and interest margin as a proxy for financial performance; however the 
results are marginally significant when we use the ROE. 
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Table 1: Variables Description 
 
Variable Description 
Female Proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors. 
FemaleSB Proportion of female directors sitting on the supervisory board. 
FemaleMgtB Proportion of female directors sitting on the management board.  
ROA Ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent 
years of total assets.   
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 
(%) 
The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial 
fragility. 
B.Size Total number of directors sitting on the board directors 
SB.Size Total number of directors sitting on the supervisory board;  
Mgt.B.Size Total number of directors sitting on the management board.  
INED Proportion of independent non-executive directors.  
CEO/Chair Dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and 
Chairman are conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise. 
LnTA Natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size.  
BankAge Bank age calculated as the number of years since bank’s foundation.  
ListDummy Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 
otherwise.  
Total capital ratio Total capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector.   
Power Distance A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for 
the cultural differences across EU countries.  
Disclosure Index Sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to 32 
questions on disclosure from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey, carried out by the World Bank is yes and 0 otherwise.  
Enforcement Index Sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to 20 
questions on enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey, carried out by the World Bank is yes and 0 otherwise.  
Overseas Branches Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branches 
and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation. 
Law Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks’ 
headquarters is located in a common law country and 0 otherwise. 
lnGDP Natural logarithm of gross domestic product in US$ 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample over the period 2004-2012 
 Mean Median SD Min Max N 
Panel A: Unitary Boards 
Female 0.100 0.071 0.107 0.000 0.583 449 
ROA (%) 0.281 0.540 2.331 -22.429 9.783 446 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%) 5.778 3.777 7.410 0.048 62.373 417 
B.Size 14.712 15.000 4.389 4.000 31.000 458 
INED 0.464 0.500 0.209 0.105 0.933 456 
NoCom 3.717 4.000 1.542 1.000 6.000 435 
CEO/Chair 0.035 0.000 0.184 0.000 1.000 458 
LnTA 11.410 11.150 1.668 7.781 14.882 447 
Bank Age 100.263 82.000 93.533 3.000 540.00 460 
List Dummy 0.193 0.000 0.395 0.000 1.000 462 
Total capital ratio 12.231 11.500 3.451 8.101 31.558 451 
Power Distance 48.318 50.000 13.447 28.000 68.000 462 
Disclosure Index 20.977 21.000 1.433 19.000 23.000 455 
Enforcement Index 13.036 14.000 3.801 7.000 18.000 453 
Overseas Branches 0.716 1.000 4.511 0.000 1.000 462 
Panel B: Two-Tier Boards 
FemaleSB 0.131 0.111 0.113 0.000 0.511 392 
FemaleMgtB 0.029 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.500 392 
ROA 0.574 0.465 0.772 -2.574 2.989 376 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%) 5.391 3.189 10.445 0.030 73.275 322 
SB.Size 12.620 11.000 5.604 4.000 29.000 392 
Mgt.B.Size 5.349 4.500 2.809 2.000 16.000 392 
INED 0.680 0.667 0.187 0.167 1.000 392 
LnTA 10.626 10.421 2.030 6.436 14.625 377 
Bank Age 79.471 75.000 64.382 3.000 275.00 393 
List Dummy 0.295 0.000 0.457 0.000 1.000 393 
Total capital ratio 14.111 13.000 4.588 8.712 37.167 343 
Power Distance 33.793 35.000 17.695 11.000 68.000 393 
Disclosure Index 21.468 22.000 1.273 20.000 23.000 393 
Enforcement Index 15.442 15.000 2.247 12.000 18.000 393 
Overseas Branches 0.646 1.000 0.478 0.000 1.000 393 
Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; FemaleSB: proportion of female directors 
sitting on the supervisory board; FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the management board; 
ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets.  Impaired 
Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility; B.Size: total 
number of directors sitting on the board directors; SB.Size: total number of directors sitting on the supervisory 
board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the management board; INED: proportion of independent 
non-executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and 
Chairman are conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a 
proxy for bank size; BankAge: bank age calculated as the number of years since bank’s foundation; ListDummy: 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; Total capital ratio: capital ratio 
as a regulatory requirement in banking sector;  Power Distance:  A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework 
(2001) to control for the cultural differences across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of 
dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank 
Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise; Overseas Branches: 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branches and 0 otherwise as a proxy for 
internationalisation. 
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Table 3: Board Structure and Diversity for Unitary and Dual Board Sample Banks 
 Belgium Cyprus Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Sweden UK 
Panel A: Unitary Boards 
Female 0.076 0.044 0.222 0.175 0.050 0.114 0.036 0.033 0.097 0.344 0.105 
B.Size 18.630 12.471 9.000 17.333 13.738 9.906 16.736 25.692 14.655 13.074 14.653 
INED 0.284 0.493 0.451 0.511 0.243 0.578 0.528 0.278 0.456 0.631 0.510 
Panel B: Dual Boards 
 Austria Denmark Germany Italy Poland Portugal Netherland Switzerland    
FemSB 0.154 0.163 0.186 0.035 0.079 0.020 0.113 0.126    
FemMgtB 0.063 0.022 0.025 0.005 0.034 0.000 0.017 0.025    
SB.Size 17.583 10.206 16.783 19.750 8.400 16.846 8.809 9.824    
Mgt.B.Size 4.139 3.079 6.033 10.750 6.756 5.923 4.506 8.500    
INED 0.645 0.676 0.736 0.735 0.613 0.556 0.711 0.690    
Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the board directors; INED: proportion of independent 
non-executive directors; FemaleSB: proportion of female directors sitting on the supervisory board; FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the 
management board;  SB.Size: total number of directors sitting on the supervisory board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the management board. During 
the period of study, some countries follow a mixture of unitary and dual board structure.  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Unitary Board Sample Banks 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 ROA 1.000                
2 Female 0.112 1.000               
3 B.Size 0.098 -0.166 1.000              
4 INED 0.038 0.324 -0.116 1.000             
5 CEO/Chair 0.010 -0.112 0.018 0.142 1.000            
6 LnTA 0.024 0.349 0.354 0.356 -0.176 1.000           
7 Impaired Loans/Gross Loans -0.423 -0.142 -0.225 -0.008 0.010 -0.197 1.000          
8 Bank Age -0.018 -0.089 0.082 0.081 -0.068 0.231 -0.001 1.000         
9 List Dummy 0.047 -0.223 -0.183 -0.223 0.177 -0.347 0.012 -0.129 1.000        
10 Power Distance -0.027 -0.327 0.437 -0.376 0.024 -0.026 0.053 -0.076 -0.130 1.000       
11 Disclosure Index -0.063 -0.204 -0.083 0.239 0278 -0.331 0.174 0.035 0.179 -0.045 1.000      
12 Enforcement Index -0.271 -0.337 0.038 -0.155 0.155 -0.386 0.366 -0.067 -0.036 0.434 0.437 1.000     
13 Total Capital Ratio 0.184 0.208 -0.137 0.101 -0.145 0.054 0.071 -0.024 -0.025 -0.091 -0.189 -0.320 1.000    
14 Law -0.048 0.048 -0.290 0.222 -0.117 0.150 0.002 0.102 0.145 -0.444 0.308 -0.411 0.096 1.000   
15 Overseas Branches 0.151 0.132 0.242 0.114 -0.119 0.451 -0.241 0.175 -0.350 0.035 -0.172 -0.296 0.089 -0.003 1.000  
16 lnGDP 0.187 0.274 0.225 0.268 0.139 0.427 -0.321 0.266 0.104 -0.165 -0.129 -0.383 -0.119 0.013 0.293 1.000 
ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets; Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; B.Size: total 
number of directors sitting on the board directors; INED: proportion of independent non-executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the role of 
the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size; Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 
(%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility; BankAge: bank age calculated as the number of years since bank foundation; ListDummy: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise. Power Distance: A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural 
differences across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from 
the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise; Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; 
Law: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks headquarters is located in a common law country and 0 otherwise; Overseas Branches: dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if a bank has overseas branches and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation; lnGDP: natural logarithm of gross domestic product in US$;  Bold figures indicate 
significance at the 5% level or below. 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix for Dual Board Sample Banks 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 ROA 1.000                
2 FemSB -0.248 1.000               
3 FemMgtB 0.022 0.100 1.000              
4 SB.Size -0.295 0.074 0.006 1.000             
5 Mgt.B.Size 0.0004 -0.105 -0.090 0.119 1.000            
6 INED -0.144 0.205 0.063 0.150 0.230 1.000           
7 LnTA -0.327 0.078 -0.095 0.364 0.452 0.321 1.000          
8 Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 0.088 -0.176 0.026 -0.092 -0.009 -0.129 -0.200 1.000         
9 Bank Age -0.059 0.204 -0.062 0.221 -0.061 0.271 0.022 -0.152 1.000        
10 List Dummy -0.133 0.053 -0.053 -0.331 -0.254 -0.025 -0.346 -0.087 -0.271 1.000       
11 lnGDP -0.013 0.136 -0.090 -0.073 0.093 0.130 0.279 0.074 -0.198 -0.141 1.000      
12 Power Distance 0.285 -0.281 -0.106 -0.256 0.400 -0.046 0.136 0.294 -0.342 -0.132 0.199 1.000     
13 Disclosure Index 0.054 -0.088 -0.082 -0.090 0.378 0.101 0.327 0.202 -0.278 -0.050 0.346 0.422 1.000    
14 Enforcement Index -0.223 0.085 -0.091 -0.217 -0.365 0.138 0.001 -0.274 0.105 0.387 0.219 -0.343 -0.125 1.000   
15 Total Capital Ratio 0.008 0.212 0.141 -0.218 0.054 0.019 -0.004 -0.050 -0.057 0.070 0.054 -0.015 0.020 -0.065 1.000  
16 Overseas Branches 0.055 -0.080 0.111 0.092 0.222 0.102 0.308 -0.285 -0.171 -0.046 -0.132 0.172 0.088 -0.039 0.044 1.000 
ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets; FemaleSB: proportion of female directors sitting on the supervisory board; 
FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the management board; SB.Size: total number of directors sitting on the supervisory board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of 
directors sitting on the management board; INED: proportion of independent non-executive directors; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size; 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility; BankAge: bank age calculated as the number of years since bank 
foundation; ListDummy: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; lnGDP: natural logarithm of gross domestic product in US$; Power 
Distance: A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural differences across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of 
dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, 
is yes and 0 otherwise; Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; Overseas Branches: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a bank has 
overseas branches and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation.. Bold figures indicate significance at the 5% level or below. 
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Table 6: The Influence of Female Directors on Financial Fragility for EU Banks: 
System GMM Estimator  
 Panel A  Panel B 
 Unitary Boards Dual Boards 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L. Impaired Loans/Gross Loans  
1.154
***
 
(0.076) 
1.237
***
 
(0.064) 
0.793
***
 
(0.053) 
0.826
***
 
(0.042) 
Female 
6.654 
(8.829) 
25.520
**
 
(12.826) 
  
Female sq  
-72.078
**
 
(34.480) 
  
FemSB   
3.471 
(4.320) 
22.814
***
 
(6.893) 
FemSB sq    
-54.393
***
 
(17.569) 
FemMgtB   
4.123 
(3.835) 
-21.127
***
 
(4.912) 
FemMgtB sq    
43.791
***
 
(16.622) 
ROA -0.306 
(0.921) 
-2.010
**
 
(0.809) 
-0.040 
(0.977) 
-0.461
*
 
(0.274) 
B.Size 
0.196 
(0.295) 
-0.001 
(0.189) 
  
SB.Size   
0.227
**
 
(0.108) 
-0.019 
(0.192) 
Mgt.B.Size   
-0.354 
(0.465) 
0.211 
(0.414) 
INED 
9.304 
(5.892) 
0.975 
(3.108) 
1.369 
(3.406) 
0.898 
(3.976) 
CEO/Chair 
-2.729 
(4.012) 
-3.298 
(3.544) 
  
LnTA 
-0.040 
(0.566) 
-0.280 
(0.527) 
0.896 
(0.861) 
-0.071 
(0.471) 
Bank Age 
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.016) 
-0.031
**
 
(0.013) 
Total Capital Ratio 
-0.752
***
 
(0.269) 
0.218
*
 
(0.125) 
-0.038 
(0.069) 
0.083 
(0.085) 
List Dummy 
15.508
***
 
(4.801) 
1.591 
(3.231) 
3.714 
(4.421) 
-7.593
**
 
(3.048) 
lnGDP 
-2.564
**
 
(1.154) 
0.293 
(0.543) 
0.646 
(1.453) 
-3.260
**
 
(1.397) 
Power Distance 
-0.376
***
 
(0.135) 
-0.014 
(0.067) 
0.102 
(0.075) 
-0.029 
(0.056) 
Disclosure Index 
-2.554
**
 
(1.067) 
0.246 
(0.506) 
-1.136 
(1.190) 
1.355
*
 
(0.703) 
Enforcement Index 
0.573
*
 
(0.317) 
-0.240 
(0.239) 
-0.572 
(0.531) 
1.072
**
 
(0.514) 
Overseas Branches 
10.297
***
 
(2.921) 
-0.750 
(2.142) 
-7.282
***
 
(1.857) 
-4.606
**
 
(1.870) 
Law 
-9.110
**
 
(3.954) 
-1.463 
(1.975) 
  
Constant 
93.959
***
 
(35.424) 
-6.219 
(15.424) 
15.513 
(14.577) 
4.363 
(10.079) 
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Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test  p.value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)   p.value 0.038 0.043 0.020 0.014 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)   p.value 0.443 0.669 0.405 0.933 
Hansen test p.value      0.881 0.473 0.937 0.508 
Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; FemaleSB: proportion of female 
directors sitting on the supervisory board; FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the 
management board ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total 
assets.  Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial 
fragility; B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the board directors; SB.Size: total number of 
directors sitting on the supervisory board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the 
management board; INED: proportion of independent non-executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person, 
and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size; BankAge: 
bank age calculated as the number of years since bank foundation; ListDummy: dummy variable takes 
the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; lnGDP: natural logarithm of gross domestic 
product in US$; Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; Power 
Distance: A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural differences 
across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if 
the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise; Overseas Branches: dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branches and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation. 
Law: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks headquarters is located in a common 
law country and 0 otherwise; Bank type: dummy variables take the value of 1 for saving, bank holding 
companies, commercial and coop banks respectively and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicates 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Clustered robust standard errors are present. 
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Table 7: The Influence of Female Directors on Financial Performance for EU Banks: 
System GMM Estimator 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Unitary Boards Dual Boards 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
L. ROA  -0.046** 
(0.021) 
0.065
***
 
(0.018) 
0.207
***
 
(0.029) 
0.033
***
 
(0.012) 
Female 
5.443
**
 
(2.641) 
11.682
**
 
(4.761) 
  
Female sq  
-27.672
**
 
(13.609) 
  
FemSB    
2.420
**
 
(0.968) 
10.955
***
 
(3.717) 
FemSB sq    
-23.500
***
 
(8.800) 
FemMgtB   
-2.295 
(1.454) 
-7.388
**
 
(3.418) 
FemMgtB sq    
13.434
**
 
(6.711) 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 
-0.035 
(0.041) 
0.007 
(0.049) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.016) 
B.Size 
-0.066 
(0.081) 
-0.071 
(0.093) 
  
SB.Size   
-0.104
***
 
(0.025) 
-0.158
***
 
(0.038) 
Mgt.B.Size   
0.235
**
 
(0.120) 
0.260
**
 
(0.121) 
INED 
-0.475 
(1.703) 
-0.412 
(1.717) 
3.262
***
 
(1.159) 
3.250
***
 
(1.065) 
CEO/Chair 
-1.344 
(1.297) 
-0.800 
(1.334) 
  
LnTA 
-0.220 
(0.263) 
-0.214 
(0.243) 
-0.495
***
 
(0.157) 
-0.459
***
 
(0.174) 
Bank Age 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.008
**
 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
Total Capital Ratio 
0.133
***
 
(0.047) 
0.145
***
 
(0.049) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
List Dummy 
-0.424 
(2.086) 
-0.917 
(2.036) 
-1.932
*
 
(1.108) 
-1.108 
(1.130) 
lnGDP 
0.437 
(0.408) 
0.554 
(0.382) 
-0.639
*
 
(0.352) 
-0.602
*
 
(0.356) 
Power Distance 
0.026 
(0.039) 
0.023 
(0.037) 
-0.032
**
 
(0.016) 
-0.026 
(0.019) 
Disclosure Index 
0.140 
(0.313) 
0.177 
(0.326) 
0.374 
(0.282) 
0.319 
(0.308) 
Enforcement Index 
-0.141
*
 
(0.075) 
-0.122 
(0.102) 
0.036 
(0.171) 
-0.015 
(0.159) 
Overseas Branches 
-0.387 
(1.094) 
-0.182 
(1.236) 
0.359 
(0.775) 
0.794 
(1.006) 
Law  
-0.552 
(1.323) 
-0.905 
(1.366) 
  
Constant -6.419 -9.217 5.550 5.736 
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(9.889) (9.619) (4.003) (4.117) 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank type Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test  p.value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)   
p.value 
0.038 0.043 0.031 0.035 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)   
p.value 
0.266 0.264 0.711 0.887 
Hansen test p.value      0.732 0.931 0.617 0.901 
Female: proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; FemaleSB: proportion of female 
directors sitting on the supervisory board; FemaleMgtB: proportion of female directors sitting on the 
management board ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total 
assets.  Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial 
fragility; B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the board directors; SB.Size: total number of 
directors sitting on the supervisory board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the 
management board; INED: proportion of independent non-executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy 
variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and Chairman are conducted by the same person, 
and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank size; BankAge: bank 
age calculated as the number of years since bank foundation; ListDummy: dummy variable takes the 
value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; lnGDP: natural logarithm of gross domestic 
product in US$;Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; Power 
Distance: A dimension from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural differences 
across EU countries; Disclosure and Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if 
the answer to questions on disclosure and enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision 
Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 otherwise;  Overseas Branches: dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branches and 0 otherwise as a proxy for internationalisation; 
Law: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks headquarters is located in a common 
law country and 0 otherwise; Bank type: dummy variables take the value of 1 for saving, bank holding 
companies, commercial and coop banks respectively and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicates 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Clustered robust standard errors are present. 
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Table 8: The Determinants of the Proportion of Female Directors in EU Banks: System 
GMM Estimator 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C 
 Board of Directors Supervisory Board Management  Board 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
L. Female 
0.955
***
 
(0.096) 
  
L.FemSB  
0.798
***
 
(0.129) 
 
L.FemMgtB   
0.852
***
 
(0.025) 
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
ROA -0.016
**
 
(0.008) 
-0.027 
(0.033) 
0.015
***
 
(0.004) 
B.Size 
0.008
**
 
(0.004) 
  
SB.Size  
0.017
**
 
(0.008) 
 
Mgt.B.Size    
-0.003
***
 
(0.001) 
INED 
0.116
**
 
(0.057) 
0.401
**
 
(0.201) 
 
CEO/Chair 
-0.022 
(0.042) 
  
LnTA 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.033
**
 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Bank Age 
0.0004 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.0004) 
-0.001
***
 
(0.0003) 
Total Capital Ratio 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.006
**
 
(0.003) 
0.001
***
 
(0.0002) 
List Dummy 
-0.061 
(0.053) 
-0.122 
(0.108) 
-0.028
***
 
(0.013)    
lnGDP 
-0.022 
(0.022) 
-0.015 
(0.037) 
-0.005 
(0.006) 
Power Distance 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004
**
 
(0.002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Disclosure Index 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.025) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Enforcement Index 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.032 
(0.020) 
0.007
***
 
(0.001) 
Overseas Branches 
0.032 
(0.052) 
0.027 
(0.101) 
0.024
**
 
(0.012) 
Law 
-0.053 
(0.046) 
  
Constant 
0.196 
(0.204) 
-0.330 
(0.440) 
-0.035 
(0.091) 
Time dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Bank type Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test  p.value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1)   p.value 
0.000 0.016 0.039 
Arellano-Bond test for 0.799 0.418 0.927 
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AR(2)   p.value 
Hansen test p.value      0.940 0.922 0.986 
L. Female: lagged proportion of female directors sitting on the board of directors; L.FemaleSB: lagged proportion of 
female directors sitting on the supervisory board; L.FemaleMgtB: lagged proportion of female directors sitting on the 
management board ROA: ratio of net income divided by the average of the two most recent years of total assets.  
Impaired Loans/Gross Loans (%): The ratio of impaired loans/gross loans as a proxy for financial fragility; B.Size: 
total number of directors sitting on the board directors; SB.Size: total number of directors sitting on the supervisory 
board; Mgt.B.Size: total number of directors sitting on the management board; INED: proportion of independent non-
executive directors; CEO/Chair: dummy variable takes the value of 1 where the role of the CEO and Chairman are 
conducted by the same person, and zero otherwise; LnTA: natural logarithm of bank total assets as a proxy for bank 
size; BankAge: bank age calculated as the number of years since bank foundation; ListDummy: dummy variable 
takes the value of 1 if the bank is privately held and 0 otherwise; lnGDP: natural logarithm of gross domestic product 
in US$;Total capital ratio: capital ratio as a regulatory requirement in banking sector; Power Distance: A dimension 
from Hofstede’s culture framework (2001) to control for the cultural differences across EU countries; Disclosure and 
Enforcement Indexes: sum of dummy variables take the value of 1 if the answer to questions on disclosure and 
enforcement from the Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, carried out by the World Bank, is yes and 0 
otherwise; Overseas Branches: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a bank has overseas branches and 0 otherwise 
as a proxy for internationalisation; Law: dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the respective banks headquarters is 
located in a common law country and 0 otherwise; Bank type: dummy variables take the value of 1 for saving, bank 
holding companies, commercial and coop banks respectively and 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * indicates significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Clustered robust standard errors are present. 
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Figure 1:  Average Proportion of Female Directors sitting 
on European Banks with Unitary Boards by Country 
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Figure 2:  Average Proportion of Female Directors 
sitting on European Banks with Unitary Boards 2004-
2012 
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Figure 3: Average Proportion of Female Directors 
sitting on European Banks with Dual Boards by 
Country 
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Figure 4:  Average Proportion of Female Directors sitting on 
European Banks with Dual Boards 2004-2012 
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Highlights 
 
 
We investigate the influence of board diversity on financial fragility; 
Europe has different governance mechanisms; 
Female representation may reduce banks’ vulnerability to financial crisis; 
Female directors on the management board are not risk averse; 
The degree of risk taking for female directors may vary based on their roles; 
The results provide guidelines to the regulators in Europe 
